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1. Introduction 
 
Violent conflict affects the lives, livelihoods and health of almost 1.5 billion people in the world 
(World Bank 2011). The number of armed conflicts has declined in recent years (Themner and 
Wallensteen 2011), but few post-conflict countries have reached a situation of stability and credible 
peace. Feeding and protecting citizens is a major challenge in these contexts (FAO 2010). Many 
individuals and households leave areas of more intense fighting to refugee and displacement camps, 
migrate to safer urban areas or move abroad. At the same time, numerous people live in conflict 
areas and survive, sometimes for decades, carrying on their daily lives in the midst of conflict and 
violence.  
 
People that live in areas of enduring conflict display various degrees of resilience: some do well out 
of conflict, some live in conditions of fear and extreme destitution and others simply get by. Levels 
of resilience depend on a series of factors both within and outside of the control of those affected 
by conflict. These factors can be grouped into: (i) the magnitude and duration of the effects of 
violence; (ii) the type of coping strategies that people are able (or allowed) to access; and (iii) the 
effectiveness of the strategies adopted to cope with the effects of conflict and violence.  
 
The main aim of this paper is to analyse these mechanisms based on available empirical evidence, 
and discuss how this evidence can be best incorporated into international and national interventions 
aimed at securing the access to food and livelihoods by individuals, households and communities 
affected by violence and conflict.3 The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the main 
channels whereby violent conflict may impact on welfare outcomes of individuals and households 
exposed to violence, including food security. Section 3 analyses available empirical evidence on how 
individuals and households cope with and adapt to living under violence, insecurity and conflict. 
Section 4 discusses the effectiveness of such strategies in the short- and long-term in protecting the 
lives and livelihoods of conflict-affected people, and proposes a framework to explain household 
resilience in maintaining food and welfare security in contexts of violent conflict. This framework is 
based on two key pillars: (i) individual and household factors that affect levels of vulnerability to 
poverty and to violence; and (ii) institutional factors that shape people‘s access to food markets and 
livelihood opportunities. Section 5 concludes the paper by discussing how these two pillars may 
offer important entry points for policy interventions in conflict-affected contexts. 
 
 
                                                 
3 The review in this paper is limited to the analysis of studies based on empirical analyses of individual and household 
coping strategies and changes in coping strategies in contexts of violent conflict. The paper pays particular attention to 
studies where efforts were made to identify causal links between conflict/violence and coping strategies.  
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2. The impact of violent conflict on individuals and households  
 
The levels of resilience or vulnerability exhibited by individuals and households affected by violent 
conflict are largely shaped by how violence impacts on their lives and livelihoods at different times. 
Conflict and violence affect the lives and livelihoods of individuals and households through the 
direct and indirect transformations they entail (Justino 2009, 2011, 2012a). Direct channels include 
changes in household composition, changes in household economic status and effects caused by 
forced displacement and migration. Indirect channels can take place at the local (community) level 
or at the national level. Local indirect channels have to do with changes in households‘ access to and 
integration within local institutions including local markets, social relations and organisations. 
National-level indirect channels consist of changes in economic growth and distribution that may 
impact on household welfare directly or through how local institutions operate (Justino 2009).  
 
2.1. Direct impact of conflict: household composition, economic status and displacement  
 
Violent conflict kills, injuries and disables people. In addition, houses, land, labour, utensils, cattle, 
livestock and other productive assets get lost or are destroyed as casualties of fighting or due to 
deliberate destruction and looting (Bundervoet and Verwimp 2005, Gonzalez and Lopez 2007, 
Ibáñez and Moya 2006, Shemyakina 2011, Verpoorten 2009). The destruction of productive assets 
weakens the access of individuals and households to their sources of livelihood and economic 
survival. Those that face sudden losses of land, dwellings, cattle and other assets will be left without 
the means to earning a living or providing food and shelter for themselves and their families. Asset 
losses will in turn impact significantly on the ability of affected households to recover their 
economic and social position in the post-conflict period (Justino and Verwimp 2006, Verpoorten 
2009).  
 
Conflict and violence affect not only household endowments in terms of physical capital, but also 
the access to and accumulation of human capital. Recent studies have dedicated considerable efforts 
to providing rigorous empirical evidence on the human capital effects of armed conflict. Evidence 
indicates that, while in some circumstances physical capital can be recovered through reconstruction 
programmes and aid (Bellows and Miguel 2009), losses in human capital are often irreversible and 
may last across generations (Justino 2012a). A slowly accumulating body of evidence has shown that 
violent conflicts result in largely negative and long-lasting nutritional effects to children in war zones 
(see section 4.1), and in significant educational losses.4 These harmful effects can often be observed 
                                                 
4
 See Alderman, Hoddinott and Kinsey (2006) for Zimbabwe, Akresh and de Walque (2008) for Rwanda, Angrist and 
Kugler (2008) and Rodriguez and Sanchez (2009) for Colombia, Chamarbagwala and Morán (2009) for Guatemala, de 
Walque (2006) for Cambodia, Shemyakina (2011) for Tajikistan and Swee (2009) for Bosnia, among others. 
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many years after the end of the conflict, sometimes decades, affecting individual and household 
labour outcomes and earnings capacity across generations (Akbulut-Yuksel 2009, Ichino and Winter-
Ebmer 2004, Léon 2012, Justino, Leone and Salardi 2012, Merrouche 2006).  
 
These effects are made worse (and often caused by) the large population movements that 
characterise most armed conflicts. The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) 
estimates that almost 44 million people were displaced in 2011. Refugees from conflict areas and 
internally displaced populations (IDPs) are some of the most excluded, vulnerable and deprived 
population groups in the world (Chronic Poverty Report 2004-05). IDP and refugee populations 
often struggle to find work (Engel and Ibáñez 2007, Ibáñez and Moya 2006), are less likely to find 
formal employment in the post-conflict period (Kondylis 2007) and display lower productivity levels 
than those that stayed behind (Kondylis 2005). These effects are aggravated by the breakdown of 
families and communities, the rise of distrust towards displaced populations and the consequent 
failure of informal social protection mechanisms and social networks (Justino 2009).  
 
The negative effects of violence may be counteracted by economic, social or political opportunities 
created by the conflict itself. Some individuals and households may benefit from the proceeds of 
looting and the growth of ‗war economies‘ (Keen 1998). The redistribution of assets (land in 
particular) during conflict (Brockett 1990, Wood 2003) may also benefit some populations groups, as 
will the privileged access to market and political institutions for those that ‗win‘ the conflict or 
support winning factions during and after the conflict (Justino 2009). Population movements, 
migration in particular, may also be associated with some positive effects on livelihoods through 
remittances and economic opportunities found outside areas of residence (Justino and Shemyakina 
2007, Lindley 2007). A small body of evidence has also shown that some areas of the economic 
private sector – not necessarily related to the war effort – may adapt and prosper during war 
(McDougal 2008). These effects are as important in understanding processes of violent conflict as 
are the more negative effects since both will have a significant bearing in explaining how and why 
some people and communities remain resilient in the midst of violence and conflict, while others 
never recover.  
 
2.2. Indirect impact of conflict on local institutions  
 
Processes of violent conflict affect the lives and livelihoods of individual and households not only 
through the direct effects discussed above, but also through economic, social and institutional 
changes that take place in the communities and areas where people live. At the economic level, 
armed conflict and the threat of violence have important effects on how local (formal and informal) 
markets operate. Two recent studies have analysed in more detail the effects of violent conflict on 
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exchange markets. Both show evidence for increases in prices of staple food during armed conflicts 
(in Burundi and Rwanda, respectively) due to the scarcity of crops, the destruction of land, seeds and 
crops and the risks associated with market exchanges during episodes of violence (Bundervoet 2006, 
Verpoorten 2009).5 The studies show in addition evidence for reductions in the prices of agricultural 
assets such as cattle and other livestock, due to the likelihood of these assets being targeted by 
armed factions during violent conflict.  
 
Beyond this work, there is limited evidence on how changes in market-related mechanisms during 
armed conflict may affect household welfare and food security. Determining the effect of these 
changes on household welfare is also interlinked with other factors such as increases in transaction 
costs when roads, train lines and infrastructure are destroyed, adjustments to credit and insurance 
mechanisms (formal and informal), changes in access to farm and off-farm employment,6 
mechanisms through which macro-level policies and interventions may reach local populations, 
changes in how households and communities cooperate, trust and related to each other, and other 
forms of institutional change that take place during conflict. These are very important issues for 
future research on the mechanisms regulating the impact of violent conflict on people‘s lives.  
 
3. Individual and household coping strategies in the face of conflict 
 
The nature, magnitude and duration of the effects of armed conflict on individuals and households 
are largely determined by the way in which different people respond and adapt (or not) to violent 
contexts. Emerging literature on the relationship between violent conflict and development 
outcomes at the micro-level has significantly advanced understanding of the consequences of violent 
conflict on local populations, particularly the more direct channels discussed above. In addition, 
there is now a sizeable body of evidence on how households living in risky economic environments, 
even the very vulnerable, develop a complexity of (ex ante) risk-management and (ex post) risk-
coping strategies.7 Rigorous empirical evidence on mechanisms of coping and adaptation in contexts 
of violence is, however, only slowly starting to accumulate. This is largely due to the substantial data 
requirements involved in the assessment of these effects.    
                                                 
5 Prices can also be kept artificially high during conflicts when farmers hide crops to avoid looting (Azam, Collier and 
Cravinho 1994). 
6 For recent work on employment markets during conflict see Ibáñez and Moya (2006) and Kondylis (2007) on displaced 
populations and Matijasevic et al. (2007), World Bank (2011) and Iyer and Santos (2012) for more general reviews. These 
studies analyse how employment markets change during conflict. An interesting extension would be to examine how 
those changes may affect welfare outcomes among different population groups living in areas of conflict, and their 
capacity to recover once the conflict is over. 
7 Common coping strategies include the diversification of land holdings and crop cultivation, the storage of grain from 
one year to the next, the sale of assets such as cattle and land, obtaining credit from formal and informal lenders, 
government income transfers, and gifts and transfers from informal support networks (e.g. family, friends, neighbours, 
funeral societies, and so forth). Townsend (1994) provides a detailed analysis and review.   
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The evidence available so far suggests that most known coping strategies are considerably restricted 
in situations of violent conflict (Azam, Collier and Cravinho 1994, Bundervoet 2006, de Walque 
2004, Gafaro, Ibáñez and Justino forthcoming, Ibáñez and Moya 2006, Tranchant, Justino and 
Müller forthcoming, Verpoorten 2009). As a result, outbreaks of violent conflict are likely to create 
cycles of conflict and poverty traps (Collier 2007, Justino 2012a). However, there are several 
examples – though less rigorous empirical evidence – of ingenuity and resilience of individuals, 
households and communities living in contexts of violence. Many households leave areas of more 
intense fighting to refugee and displacement camps, migrate to safer areas (often to cities) or move 
abroad. But many live in conflict areas and survive (Engel and Ibáñez 2007, Steele 2007, Wood 
2003), carrying on their everyday lives through sometimes decades of violence (Nordstrom 1997). 
The subsections below examine evidence on these coping strategies in more detail. 
 
3.1. Economic coping strategies in areas of violence 
 
Strategies adopted by households in response to economic risks and shocks in peaceful regions may 
differ from those adopted in contexts of conflict and violence. Violent conflicts are characterised by 
their destructive nature, including the intentional destruction of strategies available to households 
for survival, such as social networks and family ties, agricultural assets, land and so forth (see de 
Waal 1997, Justino 2009). Violent shocks, such as civil wars, have a covariate character, affecting 
often whole communities and regions. But households and individuals with characteristics that are 
salient to the conflict may be specifically targeted. This is often the case of households with visible 
assets or other characteristics that mark them as targets of violence, such as possession of large 
landholdings in Rwanda (Verwimp 2005, Justino and Verwimp 2006) and high levels of education 
during the Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia (de Walque 2006).  
 
Mechanisms and processes of coping, adaptation and targeting in contexts of violence and conflict 
are still not well understood in the development literature. A review of (limited) available empirical 
studies has shown evidence for five broad types of economic coping strategies adopted by 
individuals and households in contexts of violent conflict: use of savings and assets sales (including 
land), resort to subsistence agriculture and other low-risk activities, engagement in informal markets, 
intra-household allocation of labour and (non-forced) migration. In addition, livelihood support 
strategies of individuals and households in areas of violent conflict may also include fighting, 
looting, support for armed groups and participation in illegal activities (Justino 2009). We analyse the 
first five types of strategies below, and the latter set of strategies in section 3.2. 
 
3.1.1. Savings and asset sales in conflict settings 
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Savings and access to credit and insurance mechanisms are important determinants of the ability of 
households to cope with income shocks (see Fafchamps, Udry and Czukas 1998). As discussed 
above, one of the most devastating impacts of armed conflicts is the deliberate destruction and 
plundering of property, markets and assets (Bozzoli and Brück 2009, Bundervoet and Verwimp 
2005, Gonzalez and Lopez 2007, Ibáñez and Moya 2006, Justino and Verwimp 2006, Shemyakina 
2011, Verpoorten 2009), which limits the ability of households to rely on assets sales as a coping 
strategy, affects their productive capacity and constrains their access to (formal or informal) credit 
and insurance markets. There is, however, limited rigorous evidence on these effects. Loss of trust, 
displacement and the destruction of infrastructure are likely to severely constrain the functioning of 
local formal and informal food, assets, employment, credit and insurance markets. This effect will be 
stronger when entire communities are affected by violence (Ibáñez and Moya 2006). When violence 
is targeted at particular households or individuals, the extent of the shock will be more localised and 
community-level insurance mechanisms may continue to operate (Gafaro, Ibáñez and Justino 
forthcoming). 
 
The presence or threat of violence also affects the usefulness of assets as buffer stock. The sale of 
livestock is one common form of coping strategy used by rural households in developing countries 
in times of crisis. However, during armed conflicts, livestock can become a risky form of savings 
since it can be easily stolen or killed. Bundervoet (2006) reports that during the Burundi civil war 
almost 20% of households in conflict areas reported to have lost livestock due to theft and looting. 
Road unsafety also prevented households from accessing markets where livestock could be sold. 
Similar evidence is shown in Verpoorten (2009) for Rwanda, and in Ibáñez and Moya (2009b) for 
the case of displaced populations in Colombia. Rather than keeping livestock, households that 
remain in rural areas tend to resort to the cultivation of low-risk low-return crops that can feed their 
families. These can still be looted and destroyed, but small plots and crops are less likely to attract 
the attention of warring factions and may keep families fed (at least temporarily). 
 
3.1.2. Subsistence agriculture and other low-risk activities 
 
Most households affected by violence, or that expect being exposed to violence during armed 
conflict, tend to minimise risk either by moving somewhere safer, or by resorting to activities that 
will not attract unduly attention from armed groups. Rural households tend to resort to subsistence 
farming in the face of armed conflict (see Bozzoli and Brück 2009, Brück 2004, Deininger 2003, 
McKay and Loveridge 2005). This strategy is adopted by households that typically hold limited or no 
liquid assets (such as livestock), but also by those that anticipate being potential targets of violence. 
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Social instability and loss of trust between different individuals and groups may accentuate these 
mechanisms (Justino 2012a).  
 
Bozzoli and Brück (2009) and Brück (2004) show that subsistence farming led to some 
improvements in the economic security of households living in extreme poverty during the civil war 
in Mozambique because market and social exchange entailed limited welfare gains. McKay and 
Loveridge (2005) report that during the genocide and civil war in Rwanda in the 1990s the 
adaptation of more autarkic modes of production was associated with improved nutritional status of 
children in the post-conflict period. These potentially positive effects of subsistence modes of 
production during conflict must, however, be balanced against the long-term effects of violence on 
household economic vulnerability. We return to this issue in section 4. 
 
3.1.3. Informal exchange and employment markets 
 
A common feature of complex protected crises is the emergence of parallel economies, including 
war and shadow economies (dependent on violent and illegal assets and resource appropriation), and 
an informal coping economy encompassing the majority of the civilian population. These resort 
often to subsistence agriculture, but also depend on informal activities (mostly petty trading) and in 
some cases illegal activities (Jaspars, O‘Callaghan and Stites 2007). This is particularly the case of 
internally displaced people and refugees that move from rural to urban areas. These groups 
experience severe asset and capital losses, the breakdown of community and social relations 
following displacement, and face severe socio-economic exclusion and deprivation in their final 
locations, associated to difficulties finding appropriate employment (Engel and Ibáñez 2007, Ibáñez 
and Moya 2006, Kondylis 2005, 2007). As a consequence, they are often left with no alternative but 
to join informal networks or depend on self-employment. Some turn to illegal or criminal activities 
(Moser and McIlwaine 2004, Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006, Steele 2007). 
 
Ibáñez and Moya (2006) show that the majority of internally displaced households in Colombia were 
victims of violent attacks and endured large asset losses. Most adult workers are absorbed into the 
informal economy, where earnings are typically less than half their income prior to displacement. 
Calderón et al. (2011) report that displaced women in Colombia find it easier to join informal urban 
labour markets than men, because women‘s skills seem to be more suitably matched to the needs of 
urban labour markets than the skills possessed by male IDPs. These are, however, low-paid jobs and 
few displaced households manage to recover economically under such employment conditions. 
Similar evidence has been found in the case of displaced individuals and households in El Salvador: 
Gammange and Fernandez (2000) report that displaced households in urban areas were 
disproportionally more likely to be poor and or extremely poor. The limited potential of urban 
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informal activities to mitigate the effects of conflict was also analysed in Raeymaekers (2011) in the 
context of displaced youths in Butembo, Eastern DRC. The author finds that young people are 
often excluded, particularly in terms of economic opportunities due to discrimination and distrust. 
Walraet (2011) provides similar evidence in her analysis of livelihood choices of IDPs and refugees 
from South Sudan. This study points further that the improvement of households and individual 
economic status is highly dependent on privileged relations with the state and military powers that 
facilitate access to resources.  
 
The studies discussed above show that populations affected by violent conflict resort in very flexible 
ways to a myriad of informal opportunities. These are in general not enough to compensate for the 
negative impacts of conflict on their earning capacity, but may result in the acquisition of productive 
skills that may be relevant for economic recovery in the post-conflict period. More work needs, 
however, to be done in order to better understand these processes of resistance and resilience. 
 
3.1.4. Intra-household reallocation of labour 
 
As a result of the impact of conflict and violence on the composition of households, one of the 
most significant livelihood adaptation strategies adopted by households in conflict-affected countries 
is a change in customary gender divisions of labour. Most conflict-affected countries and areas 
within countries experience significant increases in female participation in labour markets (see 
reviews in Iyer and Santos 2012 and Justino et al. 2012).8 This is a result of two factors: the increase 
in the number of female-headed households due to the death and disappearance of male workers, 
and the fact that income generating opportunities men relied on before the conflict (such as land, 
animals and other assets) may be no longer available (Justino et al. 2012).  
 
Despite increases in female labour market participation in conflict-affected areas, women are 
particularly active in low skilled jobs and in the informal sector (Justino et al 2012, Kumar 2000), and 
tend to lose their jobs once the conflict is over, especially in the organised formal sector (Kumar 
2000). Female- and widow-headed households also face many social and economic constraints, such 
as the lack of property rights over the land of parents or dead husbands (Kumar 2000, Greenberg 
and Zuckerman 2009, Schindler 2010). As a consequence, rises in female labour market participation 
may not necessarily result in improved levels of household welfare or food security.9 
 
                                                 
8
 Many empirical studies have reported increases in female labour during crisis, including armed conflict. See review in 
Brück and Vothknecht (2011) and Justino et al. (2012). 
9 Justino et al. (2012) found evidence from improvements in household welfare as a result of increased female labour 
market participation in the conflicts experienced in Bosnia, Colombia and Timor Leste. The report found no 
improvement in household welfare levels in Kosovo, Nepal and Tajikistan. 
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In times of conflict, children may also participate in income generation activities. In particular, older 
children may replace adult males that have become fighters, died or have been injured. Or they may 
join armed groups themselves. The use of children as a form of economic security is common in 
many developing countries in times of economic difficulties (Nugent and Gillaspy 1983, Duryea, 
Lam and Levinson 2007). Akresh and de Walque (2009), Merrouche (2006), Justino, Leone and 
Salardi (2012), Shemyakina (2010) and Swee (2009) attribute the reduction in education outcomes 
observed in contexts of armed conflict to household economic insecurity and the need to resort to 
children to generate further income, or to join in domestic activities in order to release adult labour. 
In a recent paper, Rodriguez and Sanchez (2009) tested directly the impact of armed conflict on 
child labour and find that violent attacks in Colombian municipalities cause rises in the inclusion of 
children in labour markets. This form of coping strategy may, however, have negative consequences 
to the long-term welfare of households, particularly when it affects children‘s health, nutritional 
status and education, as discussed in section 4.1 below. 
 
3.1.5. Non-forced migration 
 
Migration has been one of the most important forms of household coping strategy in times of crisis 
across human history. There is some evidence that migration plays an important role in conflict-
affected countries. Some studies have shown that individuals in conflict areas migrate in order to 
avoid violence (Moore and Shellman 2004), but also for economic reasons (Engel and Ibanez 2007, 
Czaika and Kis-Katos 2009). Wealthier and healthier households are more likely to migrate from 
conflict-affected areas, whereas more vulnerable people may move to IDP camps (Czaika and Kis-
Katos 2009). Migration from conflict areas may be long-term or permanent when household 
members settle in another location, or can take on a more temporary nature, with individuals 
moving frequently between their home and urban environments, fleeing at night and retuning during 
day (or vice-versa) or moving only part of the family (Raeymaekers 2011, Stites et al. 2006, Korf 
2003). These fluid migration strategies may help households avoiding asset and property thefts, and 
enable households to derive returns from land or access food and labour markets.  
 
Despite a recent rise in remittances from countries affected by conflict (Goldring 2002), we have 
limited knowledge about the impact of remittances on household members that remain behind or 
on households that return once the conflict. This is largely due to lack of data and difficulties 
associated with tracing migrants and informal financial flows (Lindley 2007, Zetter and Purdekova 
2011). Several studies have emphasised the role of Diasporas in fuelling and funding armed conflicts 
across the world (see discussion in Collier 2007). At the same time, remittances may play a key role 
in mitigating some of the negative effects of armed conflict on livelihoods and household welfare. 
Justino and Shemyakina (2007) discuss how households affected directly by the civil war in 
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Tajikistan were more likely to receive remittances, when compared to households less affected by 
violence. Lindley (2007)‘s study of Hargeisa in Somalia has shown that large-scale migration 
triggered by the conflict resulted in important sources of income for household members that 
remained behind. Remittances were used mostly to cover for general living expenses, rather than 
establishing businesses or acquiring property and have played a key role in supporting the economic 
security of female-headed households. Remittances in Hargeisa provided also insurance against crop 
failures, health problems, and loss of income and assets (Ahmed 2000). These studies suggest that 
remittances may support household livelihoods during and after conflict and point to an interesting 
area for further research and policy attention. 
 
3.2. Recruitment into and support for armed groups  
 
Individuals and households living in areas of violent conflict face enormous challenges, and often 
adopt a mix of legitimate and illegal, formal and informal activities in order to survive and protect 
their livelihoods and maintain some level of food security. This may include the participation in and 
support for warring factions. Most of the available evidence on the relationship between civilians 
and armed groups has focussed on recruitment (forced and voluntary), although there are several 
accounts of how civilians survive and protect their livelihoods through various forms of voluntary 
and involuntary support for armed groups beyond recruitment, including the provision of shelter, 
food and information (Nordstrom 1997, Kalyvas 2006, Wood 2003). 
 
Armed conflicts may lead to new opportunities and many individuals and households have made use 
of conflict contexts as a means to improve their social, economic and political status. One of the 
ways in which individuals may use conflict to their advantage is through recruitment into armed 
groups. While some studies have emphasised the role of individual greed in recruitment into armed 
groups (see Collier and Hoeffler 2004), recent empirical evidence suggests that ordinary individuals 
join armed groups also in order to avoid destitution, as a livelihood coping strategy, and to secure 
protection from violence for themselves and their families.10 In one of the pioneering surveys of ex-
combatants, Humphreys and Weinstein (2008) discuss how RUF fighters in Sierra Leone were 
recruited with promises of jobs, while the CDF militia helped to meet the basic needs of their 
members and provided security for their families. Ex-combatants report improved prospects of 
getting a job, money and food and protection for their families as some of the most important 
motivations for having joined both armed groups. Looting and predatory activities did not play a 
significant role amongst rank and file soldiers because larger profits tend to remain with the leaders. 
                                                 
10
 Some studies have shown that socio-emotional motivations (e.g. doing the right thing, following community social 
norms, sense of justice) may have a significant role in explaining individual participation in collective acts of violence 
(Petersen 2001, Wood 2003). 
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Walter (2004) refers to the importance of ‗misery‘ and ‗lack of voice‘ as incentives for the retention 
of fighters in armed groups, while Kalyvas and Kocher (2007) argue that civilians collaborate with 
armed groups because non-participation may be more costly than participation and support. This is 
because armed groups offer protection from indiscriminate violence from opposing factions, as well 
as privileged access to resources, information and skills that are necessary for survival in zones of 
conflict (Kalyvas and Kocher 2007, Guichaoua 2009). Justino (2009) discusses how destitution, the 
risk of famine and poverty may also be factors that increase the costs of non-participation.  
 
Although we have very limited information on the impact of civilian-armed group relations on the 
economic and physical security of individuals and households in areas of violent conflict,11 some 
evidence has shown that the recruitment of young adults and children into warring factions generally 
leads to the interruption of schooling, affecting the capacity of young people to accumulate skills 
and capital and access to higher-productivity activities (Blattman and Annan 2009, Angrist 1990 
1998). However, soldiering also may result in more significant individual political participation and 
leadership amongst ex-fighters and those victimised by war (Blattman 2009, Bellows and Miguel 
2009, Wood 2003), which may well lead to improvements in their economic status and their families‘ 
in the longer term. The long-term welfare and economic security impact of recruitment and civilian-
armed group relationships remains, however, mostly under-researched. 
 
4. Effectiveness of coping strategies: individual conditions and institutional environment 
 
The analysis of the effectiveness of household and individual coping strategies during violent 
conflicts faces many methodological and theoretical challenges. One of the most significant 
challenges is the absence of adequate data from conflict areas, where food, health, consumption and 
income monitoring systems are difficult (if not impossible) to implement. For that reason, very few 
studies have examined empirically the effectiveness of coping strategies on household food security 
(or any other household welfare outcomes). Some emerging literature allows us, however, to infer 
about the potential long-term effectiveness of coping strategies on household food security by 
analysing outcomes that can be attributed to it and that can be observed after the end of the conflict 
(or in some controlled settings during conflict, such as displacement and refugee camps).  
 
The most important outcome emphasised in the literature has been the nutrition impact of violent 
conflict on children at different ages. This provides a good indication of the levels of food security 
of households during the conflict, as well as the effectiveness of coping strategies followed by 
households to secure food supplies because (mal)nutrition measures provide good proxies for 
                                                 
11 See Agency and Governance project: http://www.esrc.ac.uk/my-esrc/grants/RES-167-25-0481/read.  
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determining how permanent violent shocks may have been to the household (Banerjee et al. 2009). 
There is now a relatively large body of literature on the nutrition impact of conflict and violence and 
we review this literature below (section 4.1). 
 
While very useful and an important advance to knowledge on the outcomes of violent conflict, this 
literature stops short of providing insights as to what channels may explain differentiated nutritional 
effects – and hence food security – across different population groups and regions within countries. 
We provide a tentative framework in section 4.2. In there, we suggest that the long-term 
effectiveness of coping strategies adopted by households to secure food supplies – and hence 
household resilience in maintaining food security in contexts of violent conflict – is dependent on 
two key sets of factors: (i) individual and household factors that affect the levels of vulnerability to 
poverty and to violence, and (ii) institutional factors that shape people‘s access to food markets and 
livelihood opportunities. 
    
4.1. Effectiveness of coping strategies and household food security 
 
A number of studies have analysed the short and medium term impact of recent armed conflicts on 
child nutritional outcomes. Evidence shows that overall violent conflict leads to substantially 
negative effects on child nutrition. Akresh, Verwimp and Bundervoet (2007) analysed the effects of 
civil conflict in Rwanda during the 1990s on children under 5 years old. They report that boys and 
girls born in regions experiencing violence had height-for-age z-scores (HAZ) that were 0.30 and 
0.72 standard deviations lower, respectively, than boys and girls that were not affected by violence. 
The study shows that these effects were related to disruptions in agricultural production. Bundervoet 
and Verwimp (2005) studied the impact of the most recent civil war and the subsequent economic 
embargo in Burundi on the health status of children aged 0-5 years. They found that rural Burundese 
children affected by both shocks had a height-for-age of one standard deviation lower compared to 
similar children that did not experienced these events. Potential explanations for these results 
include the direct effect of the civil war (resulting in the breakdown of the economy and health 
systems and consequent spreading of infectious diseases among displaced people) and increases in 
food prices during the economic embargo, which were particularly damaging for the rural 
population. In a follow-up paper, Bundervoet, Verwimp and Akresh (2009) report that an additional 
month of war exposure in Burundi was associated with a reduction in children‘s height-for-age z-
scores by 0.047 standard deviations, compared to non-exposed children. These adverse effects of 
the Burundi conflict on child nutrition have resulted in serious losses in human capital. Bundervoet 
(2012) shows that children who were malnourished during the conflict had on average attained 
fewer grades than other children of the same year of birth cohort.  
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Minoiu and Shemyakina (2010) find similar effects in their work on the impact of the 2002–2007 
civil conflict in Cote d‘Ivoire on child health. Their results indicate that children from the northern 
regions where conflict was more intense suffered severe health setbacks, when compared to children 
from the lesser affected south. These adverse effects were especially pronounced for children born 
soon after the start of the conflict (during 2003–2005) and who were exposed to the conflict for a 
longer period of time. The authors attribute these results to increases in food prices during the 
conflict and reduced availability and quality of health care.   
 
Aldoori, Armijo-Hussein, Fawzi and Herrera (1994) examined the impact of the conflict in Basrah, 
Iraq, using survey data from a cross-section of children aged 0-5 years attending maternal and child 
clinics six months after the end of the Gulf war. The study found that 8% of children were wasted, 
and 24% were stunted, with worse indicators for children from low socio-economic status. A 
comparison of these results with a previous survey shows evidence for a deterioration of nutritional 
status after successive armed conflicts, likely associated to shortages of basic foods due to economic 
sanctions, coupled with exceptionally high prices, destruction of infrastructure, lack of medications 
and reduced ability to treat sewage. Also in the case of Iraq, Guerrero-Serdan (2009) shows that, in 
2006, children born in areas affected by high levels of violence are shorter than children born in low 
conflict provinces. The effect on young cohorts (13 months or younger) is between -0.22 to -0.48 
standard deviations. This is equivalent to a staggering 0.8 cm shortfall in height for a 6 month infant 
affected by the conflict, when compared to a similar child not exposed to violence. The channels 
explaining this result include the lack of well-functioning public services and rises in diarrhoea 
incidence among children living in the more conflict-affected districts due to water, sewage and 
electricity shortages.  
 
Baez (2011) takes on a slightly different approach by examining the causal effects of hosting 
refugees on outcomes of local children, using the case of Kagera in Northwestern Tanzania, which 
in early 1994 was flooded by more than 500,000 refugees fleeing from the armed violence in 
Burundi and Rwanda. The study finds evidence of adverse impacts over one year after the refugee 
movement. These adverse impacts include a worsening in children‘s malnutrition (0.3 standard 
deviations), an increase in the incidence of infectious diseases (15–20 percentage points) and an 
increase in mortality for children under five (7 percentage points). The study has found further that 
intra- and inter-cohort variation in childhood exposure to the refugee crisis is linked to reduced 
height in early adulthood, schooling and literacy. This is one of few studies showing causal evidence 
for the indirect effect of civil wars on the well-being of children across borders in refugee-hosting 
communities. These effects are explained by disease outbreaks, food and land scarcity, unsafe 
drinking water, wage competition, overburdened school and health care facilities, environmental 
degradation, and increased criminality. 
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A complementary body of evidence suggests that some of these effects may be irreversible and 
remain present into adulthood. For instance, Akbulut-Yuksel (2009) finds empirical evidence for 
strong long-term consequences of WWII on the well-being of German children affected by 
bombing by Allied Air Forces. The study reports that children who were of school age in areas that 
were bombed during WWII are now about a half inch shorter and 8 percent less likely to be satisfied 
with their current health. These results are attributed to exposure of these individuals to malnutrition 
during WWII, due to food shortages and changes in food composition. Akresh, Bhalotra, Leone and 
Osili (2012) have investigated the impact of the Nigerian civil war of 1967-70 on long-run impacts 
on human health capital by looking at adult height of females still alive today. Findings show that 
women exposed to the war at all ages between birth and adolescence (from 0 to 16 years), who are 
still alive today, exhibit reduced adult stature. Contrary to other studies, this paper shows that the 
conflict has had the largest effects during adolescence (13-16 years) than during younger ages. These 
effects are attributed to severe food shortages (notably, the collapse of protein imports) in the most 
conflict affected regions in the Biafra. de Walque (2006) also finds that the most adverse nutritional 
effects of the genocide committed during the period of the Khmer Rouge (1975-79) in Cambodia 
affected only teenagers. One possible explanation is that poor nutrition in early childhood during the 
conflict period was likely to end in the death of the child, while for teenagers it was more likely to 
result in stunted growth. In the case of Mozambique, Domingues (2010) shows that women who 
were exposed to the conflict during the early stages of their lives have, on average, weaker health in 
comparison to other women, reflected in lower height-for-age z-scores. The results are explained by 
killings, starvation, lack or disruption of health services and the enrolment of child soldiers. 
 
Akresh, Lucchetti and Thirumurthy (2010) show similar long-term adverse effects of armed conflict 
during the international war between Eritrea and Ethiopia on children‘s health in both nations. 
Findings show that children born during the war and living in regions that were more exposed to 
violence during the war have 0.77 or 0.31 standard deviations lower height-for-age z-scores in 
Eritrea and Ethiopia, respectively, than children less affected by the conflict. The main mechanism 
through which conflict may have affected child health was the displacement and deportation of 
thousands of civilians, who suffered large reductions in food production, asset losses, and worsened 
access to water and health infrastructure. No effects were found for the presence of alternative 
channels such as restricted food aid or theft of assets.  
 
Alderman, Hoddinott and Kinsey (2004) have found similar evidence in Zimbabwe. The authors 
show that in 2001, on average, children (under 5 years old) affected by the war and drought in 
Zimbabwe during the 1970s would have been 3.4 cm taller had the war and adverse weather 
conditions not taken place. The loss in stature, in addition to school losses, has resulted in reduced 
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lifetime earnings of about 14 percent. The effects of civil war on nutrition status are likely to be 
associated to lack of amenities in ‗protected villages‘ constructed during the war, and on restrictions 
to physical movement.  
 
In addition to the results reviewed above, some emerging evidence has suggested that effects of 
conflict on children through nutritional channels may take place even before the child is born. In a 
pioneering study, Camacho (2008) shows that exposure to violence may affect future generations 
through effects on foetus during the first three months of pregnancy that result in lower birth 
weights and premature deliveries. Her results are based on the empirical analysis of the birth effects 
of landmines explosions in the municipality of residence of women in early stages of pregnancy in 
Colombia.  
 
More recently, Valente (2011) analysed the impact of exposure to violent conflict in Nepal on in-
uterus foetuses and on babies shortly after birth during the Maoist insurgency between 1996 and 
2006. The study has found that exposure to violence in the first few years of life has an adverse 
effect on child nutritional status. Maternal exposure to conflict before conception is negatively and 
significantly correlated with lower height-for-age (by 0.39 standard deviations in relation to the 
reference population). The author attributes these results to psychological stress. Similar evidence is 
reported in Parlow (2012) for the case of Kashmir. This study has found that stress during 
pregnancy and limited access to health services in the more conflict-affected regions of Jammu and 
Kashmir have resulted in children that are smaller at birth: overall, children more affected by the 
insurgency are 0.9 to 1.4 standard deviations smaller compared with children less affected by the 
insurgency.  
 
These results indicate that the effectiveness of coping strategies followed by conflict-affected people 
is very limited in terms of long-term food security. These effects are observed both in the short-
term, once the conflict is over, and in the long-term, sometimes decades after the end of the 
conflict. These latter results suggest that the adverse effects of violence exposure on child nutrition 
may be irreversible: adults that were affected by violence in their childhood (and are alive today) are 
likely to be shorter, less educated and earn less than comparable individuals that did not experience 
violence in early ages. Some of these are individuals that received help and aid after the conflict or in 
IDP and refugee camps during the conflict. Still, the adverse effects of the conflict remain with them 
throughout their lives. Recent evidence shows further that conflict and violence may affect child 
outcomes even before the child is born: children born to mothers exposed to violence, stress and 
malnutrition are already at a serious disadvantage, indicating that women of bearing age and 
pregnant women are particular vulnerable groups to the effects of violence and consequent 
household economic decline. Available evidence shows also that these largely adverse effects are not 
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general and there are substantial differences across types of households, regions and levels of 
violence. What determines these differential effects? 
 
4.2. An analytical framework to analyse household resilience in conflict contexts 
 
Household resilience in maintaining food security in contexts of violent conflict is dependent on 
two key sets of factors: (i) individual and household factors that affect the levels of vulnerability to 
poverty and to violence, and (ii) institutional factors that shape people‘s access to food markets and 
livelihood opportunities. We argue that a better understanding of these two factors will provide 
useful entry points for policy interventions aimed at improving the resilience and food security of 
individuals and households affected by conflict and violence. These factors may also explain the 
success or failure of policy interventions that aim to support people‘s livelihoods in contexts of 
armed violence. 
 
4.2.1. Vulnerability to poverty and vulnerability to violence 
 
The analysis in the two previous sections suggests that the types of coping strategies adopted by 
individuals and households are a function of two important variables.12 The first is related to initial 
characteristics, which determine people‘s levels of vulnerability to poverty. The second is the likelihood 
of being targeted by violence during conflict, in other words, their vulnerability to violence.  
 
People‘s economic position at the start of the conflict, including household composition, ethnicity, 
religion and location, are important determinants of how individuals and households adapt to 
violent conflict by, for instance, drawing on savings and accumulated assets, adapting to losses in 
productive assets or accessing new forms of livelihood when displaced. Those that possess land, 
livestock and savings may be able to use them to secure their access to food and credit and to 
replace lost assets due to violence. Therefore, individuals and households that are economically 
better-off at the start of the conflict may in principle be in a more advantageous position to secure 
themselves against the adverse effects of violence. However, armed conflicts can have a covariate or 
an idiosyncratic character depending on whether violence is applied indiscriminately to communities 
caught in the crossfire or in contested areas, or whether violence is selective, targeting specific 
individuals and households (Kalyvas 2006). The idiosyncratic nature of violence means that 
households will adopt different coping strategies not only according to their economic needs, but 
also according to their perceived likelihood of being killed, displaced or looted, i.e. according to their 
level of vulnerability to violence (Justino 2009). These characteristics may have to do with observable 
                                                 
12 This section is based on the theoretical framework developed in Justino (2009) to analyse why individuals may 
participate in and support armed groups as a form of coping strategy to secure physical and economic security. 
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forms of group membership (for instance, being from a certain race, ethnic, religious or any other 
cultural, social or political group), with their geographical location (such as living in areas contested 
by armed groups or in areas where resources of interest to armed groups may abound) or with their 
economic characteristics (for instance, possessing property and other visible assets in demand by 
warring factions).13 As a consequence, households that are poorer at the start of the conflict do not 
necessarily face the worst consequences of violence because better-off households may have specific 
characteristics that may make them likely targets of violence. As a consequence of these 
characteristics, people may make decisions (like burning crops, killing cattle and livestock or 
abandoning landholdings) that may make them vulnerable to poverty in the long-run, but may 
prevent being a target of violence in the short-term. Understanding the complex trade-offs between 
economic and physical forms of vulnerability that individuals and households living in areas of 
conflict experience is of key importance in the design of appropriate policies that aim at securing 
household food security during and after violent conflict.  
 
Furthermore, levels of vulnerability (to poverty and to violence) of specific individuals and 
household are not static and may evolve during the conflict in response to the economic, social and 
political transformations and institutional change that take place locally as a result of the conflict. We 
discuss these interactions in more detail below.  
 
4.2.2. Institutional transformation  
 
The availability and effectiveness of coping strategies adopted by individuals and households in areas 
of armed violence are determined not only by their own (cultural, economic, social and political) 
characteristics, but also by the institutions and organisations that emerge from the conflict, and how 
these shape the availability of and access of people to markets and social and political opportunities. 
One crucial aspect of institutional change in conflict-affected contexts is related to the emergence of 
governance and order in areas outside the control of the state (Gafaro, Ibanez and Justino 
forthcoming, Arjona, Justino and Kalyvas forthcoming, Justino 2012b, Justino, Brück and Verwimp 
forthcoming, Kalyvas 1999, Mamphilly 2011). 
 
Although in some conflicts rebel groups may not necessarily intend to take on or replace state 
functions, many armed conflicts are characterised by the emergence of non-state actors that replace 
weak, inexistent or inappropriate state institutions. There are abundant examples of these actors: the 
FARC in Colombia, the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Taliban in 
                                                 
13 Justino and Verwimp (2006) and Verwimp (2005) show that households that were land-rich and non-poor in 1990 
were the worst affected during the 1994 Rwandan genocide. The concept of vulnerability to violence is also explored in 
Verwimp (2008).  
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Afghanistan, Al Shabaab in Somalia, amongst many others. Many of these actors resort to the use or 
threat of violence to maintain their authority, but not all do so, nor do the more violent groups 
exercise violence at all times. In many of the cases listed above, armed non-state groups have taken 
on some (if not all) of the functions of the state in terms of security provision, access to basic needs, 
building infrastructure and so forth. Some of these actors replace the state entirely as an exercise in 
demonstrating their capacity to rule once the conflict is over (Mampilly 2011, Olson 1963), others 
act in Mafia-like structures (Gambetta 1996, Volkov 2002) and others may act as mediators between 
local people and state institutions (Mampilly 2011).  
 
These processes of institutional change have been described in the literature as forms of ‗state 
collapse‘ (Milliken 2003, Zartman 1995) or ‗state failure‘ (Ghani and Lockhart 2008, Milliken 2003). 
However, despite the absence or failure of the state apparatus, governance structures may emerge 
amidst violent conflict when different actors replace weak or inexistent state institutions (that may 
well have been absent at the start of the conflict) in the provision of local public goods, the 
enforcement of property rights and social norms and the provision of security. In some cases, these 
actors are outsiders to the communities they (intend to) control, while in other cases they may be 
part of local communities and leadership structures or be related to community members via 
kinship, ethnic or other ties (Justino 2012b). These forms of local institutional change that emerge 
during the conflict are likely to have substantial effects, negative and positive, on the lives and 
livelihoods of populations living in these areas. They may also determine and control to a very large 
degree how aid structures and food provision systems may reach vulnerable populations. However, 
current understanding of these institutional changes is extremely limited, which has limited 
considerably political and development interventions in conflict contexts.  
 
Armed non-state actors adopt criminal and predatory behaviour, but also operate through non-
violent means that remain largely overlooked in the literature but shape household and community 
decision-making structures and the provision of property rights, public goods, security and justice 
(Arjona 2009, Lubkemann 2008). Furthermore, local institutions, and the actors that control them, 
determine the functioning of organisations, norms and behaviour well beyond the end of the 
conflict (Arjona 2009, Justino 2012b, Mampilly 2011, Wood 2008). Some recent literature has shown 
evidence for how local populations coexist with armed groups in areas of conflict. In particular, 
armed groups may provide employment (forced or voluntary) to household members (Humphreys 
and Weinstein 2008), facilitate (or control) access to land (Wood 2003), establish the conditions 
under which small businesses and land cultivation may continue to operate (Steele 2007, Wood 
2003) and offer physical security against outside attacks (Kalyvas and Kocher 2007). Armed groups 
in turn make use of different forms of support from local populations to advance strategic 
objectives (Weinstein 2007). These are all important determinants of how some individuals and 
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households may survive in contexts of violence that remain seriously under-researched and outside 
the scope and design of policy interventions in conflict-affected contexts.  
 
5. Final remarks and policy implications 
 
In general, we have very limited knowledge about what people do in areas of violent conflict, and 
how their choices and behaviour may affect their wellbeing and livelihoods (including food security) 
during conflict and in the post conflict period. Emerging empirical evidence on individual and 
household coping strategies during and after violent conflict suggests that people living in areas of 
conflict show remarkable levels of resilience by staying alive and carrying on their daily lives amidst 
contexts of violence that may last for generations. Stories of how people live and survive through 
conflict abound, and have led to a renewed policy interest in what makes people resilient in the face 
of such precarious living conditions. However, care should be taken in promoting this story of 
resilience. Although many people stay alive and carry on their daily lives in contexts of conflict and 
violence, in general, the decisions taken and strategies followed by conflict-affected individuals and 
households to secure access to food, but also physical security, translate into largely negative long-
term welfare consequences (particularly, in the form of reduced child nutrition). These populations 
need serious help and support, and evidence suggests that policy interventions in conflict-affected 
communities have a long way to go in terms of supporting people affected by conflict and violence, 
even when these people show resilience in the face of violence. What can then governments, aid 
agencies and donors learn from this research?  
 
The empirical evidence reviewed in this paper suggests three action points for policy and practice in 
contexts of conflict and violence:  
(i) Need to better understand what people do (well and less well) in order to support those 
activities during and after conflict;  
(ii) Need to acknowledge that the security of lives and livelihoods in contexts of enduring 
violent conflict depend on institutional factors linked to political and social distributions of 
power: humanitarian and development interventions cannot be de-linked from institutional 
and political processes; 
(iii) Need for better data collection and evaluation systems: rigorous evidence on conflict 
processes, how lives carry on and the effectiveness of interventions in contexts of violence is 
scarce and unsystematic.   
 
1. Understanding and supporting what people do (well and less well) to secure lives and 
livelihoods in contexts of conflict and violence.  
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There is very limited rigorous evidence about the mechanisms and processes of coping, adaptation 
and targeting of populations that live in contexts of enduring violent conflict. The paper reviewed 
six broad types of coping strategies studied in new emerging literature: use of savings and assets 
sales, subsistence agriculture, engagement in informal markets, intra-household allocation of labour, 
migration and recruitment and support for armed groups. This review suggests several important 
lessons about how people survive and adapt to the challenges of living under violence that may 
provide important entry points for policy intervention. In particular, existing evidence shows that 
households adopt a myriad of coping strategies even when savings, insurance and exchange markets, 
both formal and informal, break down: individuals not targeted by armed groups or living in IDP 
camps engage in a myriad of informal activities including petty trade and illegal activities, women 
and children join labour markets, some households members are able to migrate and send 
remittances and others join and support armed groups. In some circumstances, these coping 
strategies may be relatively successful in ensuring some economic, social and physical security to 
individuals and households, resulting in the acquisition of productive skills that may be useful in the 
post-conflict period. Policy interventions to support these forms of resilience may include: 
 
(i) Strengthening of female labour market participation. It is now a well-established fact that violent 
conflict is associated with increases in female labour market participation. Women generally 
join low-paid low-skilled occupations when main household workers die, get injured, join 
armed groups or migrate. A recent report by IDS-UN Women has shown that against all 
odds, and despite the dire conditions under which some of these women work, in some 
settings female earnings have contributed to the economic recovery of households in the 
post-conflict period (Justino et al. 2012). Given that improvements in women‘s economic 
empowerment may have considerable gains for child nutrition and household food security, 
it is possible that policies that support the continuation of female employment after the end 
of the conflict may yield important benefits for children, other household members and the 
women themselves. However, most evidence from conflict-affected countries suggests that 
in the post-conflict period women tend to lose their jobs due to substantial societal and 
policy pressure to return to pre-conflict status quo (Justino et al. 2012). Part of the solution 
to support the continuing employment of women and stronger empowerment effects will 
require changes in social attitudes, as well as ensuring that men are not left out from formal 
employment. Employment generation programmes including food- and cash-for-work 
programmes may be important in these contexts, although there is very limited evidence of 
their effectiveness in conflict-affected contexts. 
 
(ii) Support of mechanisms and institutions that allow the transition from subsistence agriculture to market 
exchange. The resort to subsistence agriculture is one of the main coping strategies adopted by 
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households to mitigate the effects of violent conflict. This may be a result of lack of 
opportunities outside the household and due to security restrictions, but also to the fact that 
subsistence crops are likely to attract less the attention of armed groups. Some limited 
evidence has shown that subsistence agriculture, despite its limitations, may provide an 
important source of food security and nutrition for children during periods of violent 
conflict. These effects will be important in ensuring the economic and health survival of 
household members during periods of intense instability but come at a cost to the household 
by limiting its ability to join exchange markets once the situation is more or less stable. In 
addition, during conflict and also in the post-conflict period, several restrictions will be 
imposed on the functioning of markets and on who is able to access them. Policies that will 
encourage more intense agriculture production (provision of seeds, implements and fertiliser, 
or micro-insurance policies, for instance) may help households move from subsistence 
agriculture to more market-based processes that allow a surplus and increased food stability. 
These policies must be combined with macro-economic policies that guarantee more stable 
prices given the role of increased food prices in the negative nutrition effects of conflict (see 
section 4 above). 
 
(iii) Creation of mechanisms to reduce and eventually end child labour. During violent conflict children are 
often removed from school: conflict-affected countries are responsible for over forty percent 
of all out-of-school children in the world (UNESCO 2011). There are many reasons why this 
happens: children are recruited into armed groups, fear of abduction and harm, displacement 
and the targeting of schools, teachers and students (Justino 2011). A now substantial 
literature has put forward household economic needs as one of the main reasons for the 
removal of children from school during conflict (see Shemyakina 2011). Different forms of 
child labour help maintaining food security of the household during periods of distress. 
However, it may also lead to negative long-term effects to the children involved, and their 
own families, as these children are likely to have fewer opportunities that those that continue 
their education. The influential UNESCO (2011) report on education during conflict refers 
to the need for education recovery to be part of early interventions in conflict-affected 
countries and among conflict-affected populations. There is also some ongoing discussion 
about the potential role of conditional and unconditional cash transfers in conflict-affected 
countries (ODI 2009), but almost no rigorous evidence on the possible design and 
effectiveness of cash transfer programmes in those contexts.  
 
(iv) Demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) programmes to encompass better understanding of 
why people join and support armed groups. Section 3 showed how individuals and households join 
armed groups or support their actions (voluntarily or involuntarily) in order to manage the 
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risks of economic destitution and of violence. DDR programmes are one of the most 
important set of policies implemented in countries that emerge from violent conflict. These 
programmes aim at the demobilisation of combatants into civilian structures or their 
incorporation into the state military. The programmes focus substantially on the dismantling 
of military structures and the handing in of guns and other armament. Ex-combatants are 
provided with money, social or psychological support and employment training in return. 
The effectiveness of such programmes is at best mixed (Humphreys and Weinstein 2006), 
often because the motivations for why individuals join armed groups or why they support 
them beyond recruitment are not well understood (Humphreys and Weinstein 2008, 
Guichaoua 2011). As discussed in section 3, armed groups sometimes act as important social 
structures and safety nets for individuals and their families: men (and women) join armed 
groups because they may provide needed protection against violence, may help keeping their 
families safe, may be able to provide for basic needs and may ensure that recruits and their 
immediate social networks are equipped with information and resources to survive in war 
zones. These considerations are often absent from DDR programmes, which continue to 
focus on the more military aspects of recruitment. In situations where armed groups were 
used as a form of safety net or coping strategy against destitution and violence, alternative 
safety nets provided by legitimate governments may go a long way to support the 
reintegration of ex-combatants into society and dismantle the structures that may lead to the 
re-ignition of violence. Justino (2007) provides empirical evidence for the role of social 
transfers and safety nets in preventing the rise of communal violence in India. Evidence on 
these policies mechanisms in contexts of armed conflict has remained elusive.  
 
The review of evidence in section 4 suggested that successful forms of resilience are rare and in 
most cases individuals and households are only partially able to maintain food security during 
periods of violent conflict. Efforts to maintain food security are constrained by a series of factors 
highlighted in an emerging literature on the causal effects of conflict on nutritional outcomes. These 
factors are mostly related to the destruction caused by fighting resulting in the disruption of 
agriculture production and markets, the breakdown of health systems, the lack of availability of 
medicines, the shortage of safe water, sewage treatment and electricity and restrictions to physical 
movement (due to safety issues but also as a means of population control). These factors are 
compounded by the spread of infectious diseases in camps and by hikes in food prices due to 
market constraints but also due to international embargoes in some conflicts. The evidence shows 
further that very young children (often unborn), pregnant women and women of bearing age face 
the most serious risks in terms of food insecurity during violent conflict. The negative nutritional 
effects of conflict are highest amongst those exposed to violence for longer periods of time.  
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These mechanisms indicate the main areas of priority to policy interventions in the immediate post-
conflict period: the recovery of agriculture production systems and markets, the reconstruction of 
health systems and basic infrastructure, and the control of infection diseases. Nutrition interventions 
that target pregnant women and very young children are of crucial importance in order to mitigate 
the long-term effects of conflict on development outcomes through the negative accumulation of 
human capital. Ideally these are also areas where interventions should concentrate during the conflict 
itself, although that may be unrealistic due to the restrictions imposed by fighting. Although new 
studies have provided important rigorous evidence for the magnitude of these mechanisms and their 
importance in explaining food insecurity outcomes in contexts of violent conflict, these are well-
known facts and areas where humanitarian interventions already focus.  
 
However, both humanitarian and development interventions in conflict-affected countries have 
been criticised heavily by their low effectiveness, inability to protect vulnerable populations, lack of 
coordination and difficulties in breaking vicious cycles of violence and poverty (see Addison and 
Murshed 2002, among many others). We argued in this paper that part of this failure may lie in the 
challenge in understanding key institutional changes that take place due to conflict and violence. We 
discuss this point in more detail below. 
 
2. Acknowledging that the security of lives and livelihoods in contexts of enduring violent 
conflict depend on institutional structures that emerge during the conflict.  
 
The paper argued and showed evidence that individual and household resilience in maintaining food 
security in contexts of enduring violent conflict is dependent on two key sets of institutional factors: 
(i) how people expect to be (and are) targeted by violence; and (ii) how the organisation of local 
institutions may shape people‘s access to food markets and livelihood opportunities. A better 
understanding of these two factors will provide useful entry points for policy interventions aimed at 
improving the resilience and food security of individuals and households affected by conflict and 
violence. These factors may also explain the success or failure of policy interventions that aim to 
support people‘s livelihoods in contexts of armed violence. 
 
The first institutional factor is that the decisions, choices and behaviour of people living in conflict areas depend 
heavily on their (actual or perceived) levels of vulnerability, not only to destitution and poverty, but also to violence. 
Decisions that may appear irrational from an economic survival point of view – abandoning or 
burning crops, killing cattle and livestock, joining armed groups and so forth – may be explained by 
how different individuals and households expect to be targeted by violence at different times during 
the conflict. These dual processes of economic and physical survival will determine in turn who 
copes and how with the effects of violence. Development and humanitarian interventions in 
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conflict-affected contexts are, however, still typically directed to groups of the ‗poor‘ and 
‗vulnerable‘ defined by some measure of geographic location (refugee or IDP camps), or ethnic 
identity, without much empirical evidence on who the ‗poor‘ and ‗vulnerable‘ really are, and why 
they have become poor or vulnerable in the first place. This way of identifying populations at risk 
misses a large number of people that are vulnerable across many dimensions – including in terms of 
physical but not necessarily economic security – that live in areas of violence but are difficult to find 
or identify, in particular when violence becomes part of people‘s everyday lives (Justino 2009).  
 
The second factor is that forms of coping and adaptation shape and are shaped by how institutions are organised 
locally during conflict. Development policies will fail when conflict processes, in particular the forms of 
political and social institutional transformation that they entail, are not well-understood. 
Furthermore, these institutional outcomes and processes tend to be very persistent and do not 
disappear once the conflict is over. This was clearly illustrated in the recent events in Somalia where 
local armed groups eventually played key roles in how humanitarian actors accessed vulnerable 
populations, sometimes providing relief themselves. However, the control of populations and the 
provision of security by non-state actors are perceived suspiciously by the international community, 
which associate the actions of these groups with illegitimacy, illegality and informality, operating 
outside the rule of law and of state institutions (Mampilly 2011). The problem is that, in the contexts 
analysed in this paper, state structures are absent, do not work or are illegitimate themselves in the 
eyes of the populations they aim to govern. Emerging evidence is starting to show that non-state 
actors and the organisations they establish sometimes operate sophisticated structures of 
governance, promoting (some form of) the rule of law, providing security, food and basic services 
(Arjona 2009, Arjona, Justino and Kalyvas forthcoming, Kasfir 2005, Mampilly 2011, Mehlun, 
Moene and Torvik 2006, Olson 2000, Weinstein 2007). Understanding how and when to intervene 
to strengthen the economic security of people affected by conflict and violence requires detailed and 
systematic knowledge of how state and non-state actors compete throughout the conflict, and how 
each interact with local populations. These institutional changes are important because they 
determine how political and development interventions, including justice and security reforms, 
demobilisation and reconstruction programmes, systems of food distribution, employment 
programmes and social service provision, may support or fail to support local populations.  
 
In a nutshell, humanitarian and development interventions cannot be de-coupled from institutional 
and political processes that emerge during violent conflict and persist once the conflict is over. This 
implies acknowledging that actors beyond the state shape levels of economic, social and physical 
vulnerability of populations targeted by development and humanitarian interventions, and that 
engaging with these forms of institutional transformation is a central part of the process of ending 
cycles of poverty and violence. 
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3. Better data collection and evaluation systems. 
 
The issues raised in the two action points above involve the understanding of mechanisms and 
relationships that are not easy to map, analyse and understand. The difficulties associated with this 
type of research and the resulting scarcity in empirical analyses mean, in turn, that interventions in 
conflict-affect contexts are being designed on the basis of very limited hard evidence on 
fundamental processes linking armed conflict and household welfare. This is a challenging but not 
impossible task given the recent improvements in data availability and in analytical qualitative and 
quantitative methods to better understand different types and levels of violence, how rebel 
organisations organise themselves and related to civilians, and how household preferences and 
behaviour respond to different sets of opportunities and constraints in the midst of violent 
conflict.14 Research remains however sparse, scattered and based on small samples, while policy 
interventions in conflict affected contexts are very rarely evaluated and monitored using rigorous 
analytical methods. Further efforts at the construction of rigorous, systematic and comparable 
evidence across different conflict-affected contexts requires considerable investment in appropriate 
methodological systems, as well as serious engagement between researchers, the international policy 
community and local governments (including their own statistical offices). Better knowledge will in 
turn result in better and more effective policy interventions to provide food and economic and 
physical security to the millions of people that continue to live under violence and conflict. 
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